Pork production has been evolving from relatively small, family-run operations toward large-scale operations with several employees. This study uses a national survey of pork producers and their employees to answer several questions about the structure of wages and benefits in this rapidly changing labor market. The findings include: 1) wages do not differ across regions of the country but, instead, reflect differences in worker skills and firm size consistent with a nationally competitive labor market; 2) there is no evidence that large producers have market power in local labor markets that enable them to pay lower wages than competitors; 3) rather; large firms pay higher wages, offer better benefits, and safer working environments than smaller firms; 4) the wage premiums in larger firms seem to be partly explained by the greater use of skill-intensive technologies in large firms; 5) the remaining wage premium in large firms seems to be consistent with returns to scale that are partly shared with labor; 6) salary, benefits, and a sage working environment all contribute to worker job satisfaction so that firms offering better working conditions and benefits can pay lower salaries than competitors with fewer benefits or inferior working environments. 
Poik production in the United States has shifted from relatively small, family-run operations to large-scale farms with several employees. This trend is illustrated dramatically by aStigler-type (1958) survival analysis in Figure 1 . Production shares in 1990 relative to 1995 are traced out by production size. Ratios above one imply lost market share, whereas those below one imply rising maiicet share. The pattern shows gains in production shares for farms with production levels above 3000 hogs per year, with progressively larger gains in market share as production size increases. Production shares for the smallest farms fell 26 percent, whereas market shares for the largest farms rose 43 percent. The gains in market share for the largest operations mimic the findings of declining long-rim average cost in porit production (Good, Hurt, Foster, Kadlec, and Zering, 1995) .
Increased scale ofhog production eventually necessitates additional labor services beyond those provided by family members. Increased scale ofoperation seenns to be complementary with the adoption ofnew technologies. Some ofthese new technologies require little ifany additional labor while others such asartificial insemination are much more labor intensive. Additionally, many of these new technologies require more skilled labor. Thus, changes in thestructure ofthepork industry have been accompanied large changes in the demand for labor numbers and skills.
The National Poric Producers Council -National Hog Farmer Magazine (NPPC-NHF) survey of poiic producers and their employees was conducted to shedlighton this rapidly changing rural labormarket. Several issueswere of particular interest. One issue was whether differences in the concentration of large-scale pork production across regions were creating local labor markets with idiosyncratic wages or if wagesseemed to be set consistenUy across regions. I^lated to the issueof local labor market segmentation is whetherfactors afiecting wages in the pork industry are consistent with those in more-established labor markets outside agricultiue. A third issue is how technologyand size of farm affect wages; if new technologies and larger farms are associated with lower unit costs, are these rents shared wiUi labor, or do all benefitsaccrue to management. Alternatively, do large plants have local monopsony power that enables them to pay wagesbelow those of their smaller competitors? Finally, are hazards associated with the pork production priced in the labor market through compensating wage differentials, and are benefits also priced? The rapid changes in the structure of the poric industry make it an ideal candidate for this analysis-there are large differences across farms in technology, size, and location, yet all factors produce a homogeneous product priced competitively in a national market. Hence, if the labor market in the industry behaves competitively as well, wages should reOect differences in marginal products across workers and their farms in a manner consistent with the labor market at large.
We analyze the NPPC-NHF data within the framework of the standard human capital model of wage determination developed by Mincer (1974) and reviewed in Willis (1986) . We extend the standard model by analyzing how technology and plant si^influence wages. We also evaluate the information on compensation and job attributes in the context of a hedonic framework to calculate trade-offs between alternative benefit packages and salary. Our results support three main conclusions. First, we do not find substantial evidence of regional or local labor market segmentation. Differences in wages are explained by traditional measures of human capital, as well as by differences in gender and firm size consistent with patterns in the labor market as a whole. There is no evidencethat larger firms pay lower wages, and in fact, the opposite pattern holds. Part of the wage premium paid by larger firms is related to a production complementarity between skilled labor and technolo^use and some to apparentrent sharing of returns to scale in production. Finally, we find significant and consistent trade-offs betweensalary, insurance benefits, an employee's working conditions, and an employer's provision of safety equipment. Hurley, Kli^nstein, and Orazem (1996) found that employees in the hog industry are significanUy more likely than other farmers to complain about nagging health problems. Together, the results suggest tiiat employers compensate, insure, protect, or provide the means to protect their employees' against work-related health risks.
The paper is organized as follows; Section II estimates a standard human capitalearnings function with the addition of gender, firm size, regional and local regressors, and tests for the significance of regional and local labor market segmentation. Section III re-estimates the earnings functions controlling for technology use among different firms. Section rv estimates the trade-offbetweensalary, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Section V offers a summaiy and conclusions.
n. Earnings Functions Difference in marginal products across woricers are typically associated with differences in human capital. Human capital can begeneral toall jobs, such asthe^ility to read and write proficienUy, orfirmspecific, such as theknowledge ofwork rules or standard operating procedures. General human capital isusually associated with an individual's years of formal education and years of experience in the work force regardless of current or pastoccupation. Firm-specific human capital is traditioimlly associated with the number ofyears that an individual has woiked for an employer. In addition to human capital, other personal and employer characteristics have been found important determinants of wages. Women are traditionally found to earn le^than men (Gunderson, 1989) even when human capital differences are held fixed. Larger firms pay more than smaller firms (Brownand MedofT, 1989) ,although the reasonfor the wagepremiumis unclear. If labor maricets are segmented so that labor cannot flow freelybetween local markets,^stematic wage differentials may exist between regions. A standard earnings function that incorporatesthese factors can be written as
(1) \nW = aQ_ + a^K + a2E + +0^7 + 0^7^+agF + ajP + ajN + Raj^+La^+£ whereIn^is the natural log of annual wages, K is yearsof formal education, E is years of work experience, T is years offirm tenure, F is a dummy variable thattakes thevalue ofoneif the incumbent is female, Pis firm's level of annualpork production, N is sizeof firm's laborforce, R is a vector of regional dummy variables, L is a vector of local labor maricet variables, and f is a random disturbance. The quadratic terms in job experience and firm tenure mimic commonly observed concave earnings profiles overtime if aa > 0, as < 0, > 0 and < 0. The NPPC-NHF surv^was sent to 9000 individuals designated as employee on the NHF's qualified mailing list. Of the 9000 survQ's, 1538 were returned for an initial response rate ofjust over 17 percent. Of these, 967 or II percent of the original samplehad complete information n^ed for the analysis. The survey provided direct informationon employee education, tentire, and gender and on firm employment and location. Experience was measured as the respondent's age minus years of formal education minus six. Annual hog pr(^uction was reported by size categories, so production was approximated by using midpoints. The largest categoiy (25,000 or more) was given a value of 40,000.
Local labor market characteristics were constructedby using 1990 census data and 1993 Bureau of Economic Analysis data by county. These regressors included a Herfindahl index ofemployment concentrationt he proportion of the county population over 25 with a high school diploma, the county employment rate, the county average annual income, and proportion of county employmentin agriculture. Table 1 (a) reports the means and standard deviations for the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. Due to the ordered, categorical nature of annual wage information, the parameters in equation (1) cannot be estimated directly by using ordinary least squares. Instead, we use an ordered probit specification (Greene, 1990, pp. 703-706) . Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients for four alternative models. Model 1 is the full model, including all Regional and Local labor market characteristics. Model 2 eliminates the Regional regressors. Model 3 eliminates the Local regressors, and Model 4 eliminates both the Regional and Local regressors. At the bottom of Table 2 is the maximized value of the log-likelihood fimction and the log-likelihood ratio tests for Models 2, 3^and 4 against Model I.
First, notice that, at a five-percent level of significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the regional and local labor market characteristics do not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model. In addition, the estimated coefficientsfor Human Capital, Gender, and Firm Size are consistent with the results of' other more-established labor markets and are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the local and regional variables. These results suggest a national market for workers in the pork industry instead of locally segregated markets.
Ordered probit estimates are based on an artificial index that does not have a direct correspondence to annual rat^of return. This makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients. To obtain an estimated annual rate of return, we regressed the estimated thresholds from the ordered probit on the NPPC-NHF survey's dollardenominated thresholds by using ordinary least squares:
(2)
• r = y"+y,fi + E where y is a vector of the surv^'s dollar-denominated thresholds, is a vector of the corresponding estimated thresholds, and yi are the intercept and slope coefficients, and f^is a standard normal random errorterm.^By ' This is taken to beSj-i" where ei is theemployment share oftheith two-digit SIC industiy in thecounty.
Index values close to one represent more concentrated labor markets, and values close to zero reflect broadly distributed employment across industries.
These regressions explained more than 98 percent ofthevariation for allfour models.
using the estimated coefficientsfrom equation (2) attributes. An additional year of education generates an annud return of about 5 percent of anniial earning. An additional year of experience and tenure is worth about 1 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. In addition, marginal returns to experience increase at a decreasing rate so that lifetime wages peak at about 25 years of experience. Workers on farms earn an 8 percent premium for every additional 10,000 hogs produced and a l.S percent premium for every 10 additional fUll-time employees. These last two results indicate that larger firms do not pay substandard wages, nor do th^locate atypically in low wage markets.
The premiiun for working in larger operations has been observed in other labor markets. Some hypotheses a^anced are that larger firmis pay higher wages to obtain higher-^iuality labor, larger firms pay more to fore^l unionization, larger firms pay more because they can afford to, and larger firms pay more to avoid monitoring cost. When Brown and Medoff (1989) considered these alternative hypotheses, they found little support for all but the first. Although Brown and Medoffdid find that larger firms paid more to obtain higherquality labor, the support was not strong enough to completely explain the positive relationship between firm size and wages. Technology information collected by the NiPPC-NHF gives us the opportunity to explore anadditional hypothesis-that the wage premium reflects specialized skills required by newer technologies, which have been atypically adopted by larger firms.
HL XechDology and Earnings
Pork production is a biologically constrained process. Stock must be bred, followed by a fixed gestation period, birthing, weaning, growing, and finishing. That is not to say that technology cannot help speed or improvethe process. Artificial insemination can help improvegene pools (Singleton and Schinckel, 1995) . Early weaning may reduce the time between breeding cycles for a sow and reduce disease. Split-sex and phase feeding can improve nutritionand feed efficiency. All in / all out production can reduce the days to market, and multiple-site production can help curb the spreadof disease and reduce death loss. Each of these technologies improves efficiency by either speeding up the productioncycle, lowering input cost, or reducing output loss. Alone or in combination, these technologies have been estimated to reduce the cost of production or incr^se revenues anywhere from $1.79 to $11.59 per hog (Hurt, 1995) .
In addition to improvements in production technologies, improvements in organizational structurecan help firms allocate resour^s moreefficiently. Computers can reduce the lime required and improve the accuracy of maintaining both production and financial records. Formal management practices suchas the provision of employee handbooks, written jobd^riptions, work plans, andformal evaluation procedures can help efficiently organize anddirect labor resources. Asfirm size increases, these practices support thedivision of labor into specializations. Improving laborproductivity translates into a low^r marginal production cost.
Some technological advances require few if anyspecial skillsto implement. Others require skilled, quality labor. Some technologies may be feasible only in large operations, whereas others are equally effective regardless of firm size. Forexample, multiple-site production requires little if any additional skill on the partof labor, but may require greater armual hog production and more fiill-time employees to support. Alternatively, it requires special training toimplement a program ofartificial insemination orto operate a computer. Artificial insemination may beequally effective regardless ofarmual hog production, but also may require additional labor resources. Computer use may beequally effective regardless ofannual hog production while reducing the labor requirements for record keying. Ingeneral, however, ifskill-intensive technolo©' adoption is more viable in largerfirms, then largerfirmswill haveto pay higherwages to compensate workers for their abillQi' to implement these technologies.
The NPPC-NHF survty data afford us the opportunity to determine whether higherwages in largerfirms are explainable throughmoreadvanced technology adoption. The survey askedemployees if thQ' are currently usingartificial insemination, splitrsex feeding, phase feeding, multiple site production, segregated earlyweaning, medicated early weaning, modified medicated earlyweaning, and/or all in/all out production methods. Respondents werealso askedif a computer is usedto helpmanage the operation, if employee handbooks, written job descriptions or work pla^are provided, and if theyare formally evaluated. For tractability, we combine segregated earlyweaning, medicated earlyweaning, and modified medicated earlyweaning into a singlemeasure of early weaning technologies. Provisionof either employee handbooks, writtenjob descriptions, work plans, or formal evaluations were assumed to indicate the use of formal management practices. Summaiy statistics for these technologies and management variables are reported in Table 1 (a). Table 4 (a) reports the conditional means for Human Capital and Technologybased on annual hog production. Larger firms have less experience and tenure partlybecause these firms have recently^n expanding their employment Newerhires will havelesstenure by definition. Average education also doesnot differ by size of operation. However, use of all the technologies in Table4 (a) increases with annual hog production. It is possible that larger firms may pay more to compensate employees for the skills requiredto implement more advanced technologies.
We test this hypothesis by re-estimating Models 1-4, controlling for Technology. Table 5 reports the orderedprobit estimatesfor Human CapUal, Gender^Firm Size, and Technology. As before, inclusionof Region^and Local regressors, the maximized value ofthe log-likelihood fimction, and log-likelihood ratio test for Models 6,7, and 8 against Model 5 are also reported. Again, note that there are no significant regional or local effects. ComparingModels 1-4 with ModelsS-8, the results are consistent, with two notabledifierences. The number of full-time employeesis no longer significant, and tenure is now significant at the five percent level. Formal management practices, artificial insemination, phase feeding, and all in/all out production technologies are all positive and significant at the one percent level. All other technology parameters are positive but not statistically significant. Table 3 (a), inclusion of Technology reduces the rate of return to education by about 20 percent and, to annual hog production and munber of iiill-time employees, by about37 percent. The rate of return to tenure for an average employee increases by about 50 percent. Firms that are better organized in the sense that they use employee handbMks, written j(k) descriptions, woiic plans, and/or formal evaluations pay their workers about 15 percent more annually. The use of artificial insemination, phasefeeding, or all in/all out production technologies increases worker compensation by about 6 to 7 percent annually.
To gain additional insights into the role of technology in wage determination, we can characterize the technologies as education-intensive, experience-intensive, labor-intensive and/or scale-intensive through the use of auxiliary regressions which predict the probability of technology use as a fimction of operation attributes. These regressions (available fix}m the authors on request) suggest that all the technologies are scale intensive, as suggested by the cross-tabulations in Table 4 (a). Artificial insemination, phase feeding, multi-site production and early weaning were labor intensive. Artificial insemination, split-sex feeding, phase feeding, all in/all out and formal management practices are education intensive. However, none of Uietechnologies are experience-using. In fact, the education^intensive technologies were experience-saving, consistent with a pattern of recent expansion of skill'intensive technologies. The technologies which significantly increased wages were the ones associated with education intensi^. Early weaning and multi-site production which were labor-but not atypically skill-intensive did not alter wages significantly.
The inclusion of the technology regressors reduces the return to employment size by about one-third, supporting the hypothesis that some of the Brown-Medoff size effect on wages is related to technology choice. In addition, skills needed to implement new.education-intensive technologies are hired at a wage premium. Nevertheless, the scale-wage effect is still present, even when technology controls are added, consistent with the hypothesis that large firms share rents with workers. The reduction in the returns to education in the presence of technology controls isconsistent with the finding that these t^hnologies are education-intensive. Leê xperienced, educated workers are being hired to implement these new education-intensive technologies. Once type of technology is controlled, the traditional returns to tenure are once again evident.
IV. Salary^Fringe Benefits, and Working Conditions
Wages are animportant part ofany compensation package, but total compensation generally consists of more than just wages. Employers offer fringe benefits such as insurance benefits, incentive plans, retirement plans, paid time off, orin-kind goods and services. Inaddition to alternative goods and services, ah employee's working conditions are important. Hurley, etal. (1996) found a greater reported incidence ofnagging health problems for hog operations ingeneral and further evidence ofan even greater incidence ofhealth problems in confinement operations. Whether these nagging health problems are life threatening ornot, employees may require compensation to offset thedisamenity ofunpleasant woridng conditions. Therefore, the cost to an employer ofhiring anadditional worker is not just the salary paid to the worker, but also the cost ofany fiinge benefits and the cost ofproviding acceptable working conditions. The cost ofproviding fiinge benefits is likely to be less for larger firms, sotheshare ofbenefits in total compensation islikely toincrease with thesize.ofthefirm.
Larger firms may also have a greater incentive to provide safer work environments because the a)sts are spread over more output, making the unit cost of safety investment smaller.
Ina competitive labor market, employees choose among alternative compensation packages and working conditions on the basis oftheir preferences. Favorable tax laws and group discounts due to risk pooling may cause employees tofavor one dollar ofhealth insurance toone dollar in salary. This provides an opportunity for employers totrade offemployee salary with fringe benefits and investments in working conditions inways that raise worker utility without raising overall labor costs.
Results from earnings fiinction estimates suggest a nationally competitive labor market in pork production. This suggests thatfirms must offer a compensation package that at least matches theopportunities a woriter haselsewhere. Let A , b e theworkers utility from his current compensation package, where fT/r is thesalary, Bf is a vector ofbenefits, Zp is a vector ofjob amenities or disamenities, r,isunobserved tastes, and the rest ofthe variables are as already defined. The worker's opportunity utility at other firms depends onthe worker's general human capital. This opportunity utility isgiven by ' where thefirst three variables measure worker human capital and Z, represents the strength ofthelabor market for workers with those skills. Worker satisfaction from thefirm's compensation package depends upon thedifference in the utility offered by the firm relative totheworker's opportunities elsewhere, so that (4) S=U^-U"=^,,B,Z"L"K:,E,J"F"P"N,-,x)>a where S is some index ofsatisfaction. Worker satisfaction isassumed to bepositively related towages, benefits, andfirm amenities and negatively related tofirm disamenities, holding theworker's opportunities elsewhere fixed. Because there areseveral ways firms canaffect worker utility, it is optimal for firms toadjust theircompensation package so as to equalize the marginal utility perdollar expended onwages, benefits, andinvestments in working conditions. Firmsthat havecostadvantages in providing benefits or favorable working conditions would be expected to offercompensation packages withmore benefits, fewer health risks, and lower wages, otherthings equal. Because human capital should raise opportunities elsewhere as well as compensation within the firm, it should have no systematic effect on worker satisfaction.
In addition to the individual, firm, and regional variables discussed earlier, the NPPC-NHF survey collected detailed information on fringe benefits and working conditions. The vectorof fringe benefits was constructed as follows: Insurancepremiums is the approximated aggregate insurancepremiumpaid by the employer, constructed by using surv^data and information from a local insuranceagent. After determining whether or not an employer offered major medical, dental, disability, and/or life insuranceto an employee and his family, we calculated the average proportion of the premium paid by employers. A local insuranceagent quoted us the standard premiums paid for an individual whoseaverage age was equal to the average age of our respondents. We calculated an aggregate premium by summing the average standard premium paid for each benefitmultipliedby the average proportion of the premium paid by the employer." Admittedly, this approximation is a rough estimate, but it does capture the^stematic differences between what benefits are offered and what percentage of those benefit premiums are paid by an employer on average. Incentive plan is a dummy variable set equal to one if an employee indicated receiving performance-based compensation such as a profitsharing plan or a bonus paid for greater feed efficiency, reduced death loss, and/or some other measures of producUon efficiency influenced by an employee. Paid Urae offis adummy vanable that was set equal to one ifan employee indicated receiving paid vacaUon days, holidays, or sick leave. In-kind transfers was adummy variable set Mual to one ifan employee indicated receiving paid housing, uUlities, vehicle, processed meat, and/or .nntinninp educaUon expensBS. Finally, retirement plan is adummy variable that was set equal to one ifan employee indicated receiving retirement benefits. Each ofthese benefits is an alternative form of compensation and is expected to increase satis&ction. ,
The vector ofjob amenities and disamenities was constructed as follows. Because dust and gas levels were both highly correlated with the employee*s reported woridng environment wittothe hog facilities, we used the measure ofan employee's working environment to construct aset ofdummy variables that capture marginal differences in woiking conditions. Excellent to good, good to fair, and fair to poor are all dummy variables that were set equal to zero ifthe employee reported that his working environment was excellent Ifan employee reported timt his working environment was good, excellent to good was set equal to one, and good to feir and fair to poor were set equal to zero. Ifanemployee reported that his working environment was fair, excellent togood andgood tofairwere setequM toone, andfairtopoor was set equal tozero. If^employee reported that his workingenvironmentwas poor, excellentto good, good to fair and fair to poor were all set equal to one. Inasmuchas each dummyvariable represents successive marginal declines in the employee's working environment, negative impacts on satisfaction are expected. Finally, Uie dummy.variable mask or respirator was set equal to one if an employee indicated that his employerprovideda dust mask or respirator. Because an employer'sprovisionof a dust mask or respiratorgivesan employee the opportunity for protectionagainst woricrelated health risk, a positive relationship between mask provision and satisfaction is expected. Table 4 (b) reports the conditional means of our vector of fnnge benefits and working conditions. Notice that salary and insurance premiums are increasing in annual hog production. Incentive plans and paid time off are more common in firms with greater annual hog production. In-kind transfers are not as strongly related to a firm's annual hog production, and retirement plans seem more common in firms with low or veiy high annual hog production. In terms ofworking conditions, it seems that the largest firm, those producing more than 10,000 hogs annually, do in fact have the most favorable working conditions. Nearly 85 percent of employees working for these large firms reported good or excellent working conditions. Alternatively, just over 71 percent of employees working for the sm^lest firms, those producing less than,2,000 hog annually, reported good orexcellent working conditions. Firms with higher levels of production are also more likely to supply dust masks or respirators.
Although we do not have a direct measure of utility, we do have a suitable proxy. The NPPC-NHF survâ sked einplpyees if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "My salary and benefits are competitive with other job opportunities in this community." This statement, while indirect, measures how an individual rates job prospects within his community. The more likely an employee is to agree with this statement, the happier an employee is with his current compensation package and employment. Therefore, we use the probability that an employeeagrees with this statement as a measure of the employee's utility or level of satisfaction with the compensation package and job. Let Yequal one if an employee agrees with the statement above or zero if he disagrees. Assumingthat islinear, (5) Pr(7 =1) = Pr(^(zS +r, >O) =Vx{-X^^= 1" . r(0 is the cumulativedistributionof ly.. On average, almost 78 percentof employees agreed with the statement. This agreement generally increased with annual hog production. The parameters in equation (S) and the likelihood that an employeeagrees with the statement are estimated by using the Probit model (see Greene, 1990, pp. 662-686) . Table 6 reportsthe estimatedcoefficients and standard errors. First, notice that all coefficients are of the expected signs with the exception of the paid time off*, which is not statistically different from zero. The coefficients for Salary, insurance premiums, excellent to good, good to fair, and mask or respirator are all significant at the five percent level.
The implicit value of firm benefits, amenities, and disamenities is impliedby the parameters in equation (S). Supposea firm is considering changing a benefit level from Bf to Bp, where we assume, for ease of exposition, that the vectorBp has only one variable. The worker'svaluation of the benefitchange is the change from Wp to Wp* needed to leave the woricer's satisfaction unchanged. This compensating wage differential is implicitly defined by Pr(l' =1) =1-+2Az +®)) =1-r{-{hw, + +Z,<I>,+ <D)) which implies = <t>"Wp +B^<P^where, for ease ofexposiUon. ®is set equal to the sum ofall remaining factors weighted by their respective coefficients in equation (5). The dollar trade offbetween benefits and wages is -i}V^-Wp) / = Similarly, the other tiade-offe are computed by dividingâ nd^by^. This norniali2ation yields marginal trade-oflfs that are measured in terms of salaiy dollars. These trade-of& are also reported in Table 6 .
The dollar equivalents for insurance premiums, excellent to good, good to fair, and mask orrespirator are all significant atthe five percent level. The dollar equivalent for insurance premiums implies that an employer can reduce ain employee's salary by about $2.60 for every dollar ofinsurance provide. Given group discounts^d favorable tax treatment, we expected this trade offto exceed $1. Employees working infacilities with excellent as opposed to good working conditions are willing togive up more than$10,000 in salary and are stillequally satisfied with their compensation package. Similarly, employees working in facilities with good as opposed tofair working conditions are willingto giveupjust under$8,000 in salary and are still^ually satisfied with their compensation packages. Alternatively, by providing a dust mask or respirator, an employer can reduce an employee's salary byjust over $6,800 while still maintaining the employee's level of satisfaction with his compensation package.Ĥ og fanners and their employeesare significantly more likely to report nagging health problems relative to the population as a whole. These nagging healthproblems will driveworkers from hog production imlessthâ re appropriately compensated. Wefind that employees are in factcompensated for poorer working environments that lead to increased health risks. Employees express a willingness to accept lower wages in exchange for protection against the risk of nagging heal^problems or for insurance that provides treatment should nagging healthproblems arise. An employer can provide protection by improving the working environment, or by providing protective gear such as a dust mask or respirator. The first strategy guarantees a reduction in an employee's health risk, while thesecond strategy shifts the burden ofprotection totheemployee. While a dust mask or respirator may beavailable, an employee must choose to use it soas toreduce any health risk. Therefore, we would expect employees to prefer thefirst strategy tothesecond as is indicated by thevalue ofthese trade-offs. Interestingly, while over 80 percent of employees indicate theprovision of a dust mask or respirator, only about 20 percent report using them. This suggests that thevalue ofthemask is primarily an option value. Employees want theoption touse themask should they choose to do so. Alternatively, health insurance can provide treatment for employees whofind themselves afflicted with nagging health problems.
Although these trade-offs are ofthe correct sign, the magnihides seem high. The estimated dollar trade-oflfs proved extremely sensitive to the magnitude ofthe coefficient on salary inTable 6.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Increases in firm size and the adoption of new labor-intensive technologies have increased the demand for labor numbers and skill in rural labor markets. rAlthough anecdotal e^dence of regional differences in wagessugg^the possibility ofre^onal or local labor market segmentation, the 1995 surv^datadonotsiipport this hypothesis. Differences in wagesare consistentwith other competitive labor marketsand can be expired by differences in human capital, gender, and firm.size. Larger firms pay more, in part because of a production complementarity between skilled labor and technology. However, even controlling for technology, a strong positive relationship between wages and annual hog production remains. The higher wages offered by larger firms do not support the hypothesis that largerfirms locate in labor marketswith atypically low wagesor that larger firms exercise monopsonypower in local labor markets. The more generous compensation packages paid by larger firms suggest that rents accrued as a result of cost savings due to economies of scale are shared with employees.
• • •. . .
• . V; t.' We find significant trade-offs between sal^, insurance premiums, working environment, and an .
employer'sprovisionof a dust mask or respirator. These trade-offs indicate that employees are willing to accept lower wages if an employer is willing to provide a less risl^work environment, supply voluntaiy protection, or insure an empl<^eeagainst work-related health hazards. Therefore, employees.arerequiring either compensation, protection, or insurance for work-related health risks, and employers are choosing those options for which they have a comparative advantage in providing. On average,-larger firms provide more generous benefit packages and safer working environments, suggesting that larger firms may also enjoy returns to scale in the provision of benefits and investments in workplace safety. ' Annual Hog-Production ' Salaiy codes: 0=Less than $10,000,1=$10,000 to $15,000,2=$15.000 lo$20,000,3=$20.000 lo$25,000,4=$25,000 to$30,000,5=$30,000 to $35,000,6=$35,000 to $40,000,7=S40.000 to $50,000 and 8°$50,000 to $60,000. (1.55) .
•^.0002
Gender " "" " "~.
. Log-likelihood^70.77 *The absolute value ofthe t*statikic is indicated in parentheses.
""The dollar equivalent isestimated by dividing each ofthe Fringe Benefit and Working Condition coefficients by the Salary coefficient 'Per $1,000.
•Significant at the 5% level. **Significantatthe 1% level.
